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Abstract
This note shows that a monopolist facing any linear demand system for n goods and no fixed
costs will produce positive quantities of all goods as long as demand is positive for all goods
when all are sold at marginal cost. This is in contrast with the traditional view that, in general,
a multiproduct monopolist does not produce positive quantities of all goods even though there
is positive demand for each of them when prices are equal to marginal cost.
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The Incentive of a Multiproduct Monopolist to Provide All Goods
It is well accepted in the literature that, in general, a multi-product monopolist may
choose not to produce positive quantities of all goods. This arises because pricing of one good
"interferes" with pricing of other goods. In particular, if a good of low value is offered at a low
price while a good of high value is offered at a high price, consumers that would have bought
the high value good if both goods were offered at marginal cost may now buy the low value
good. This imposes constraints on the monopolist who may find it better not to offer the low
value good at all.1
In contrast, this note shows that a monopolist facing any linear demand system (derived
from a quadratic utility function) will produce positive quantities of all goods. This is true
despite potentially very significant differences in the willingness to pay for different goods. The
only requirement for this result is that positive quantities are demanded for all goods when they
are all sold at marginal cost. Thus, essentially this paper shows that the "interference" between
high and low value goods in the pricing of the monopolist never happens for linear demand
systems.
Let a single consumer have a quadratic utility function in x1, x2, ..., xn, that is separable
in the outside good x0, i.e,
U(x0, x1, ..., xn) = x0 + Σni=1 αixi - [Σni=1 βixi2 + 2Σi≠j γijxixj]/2.
1 See Mussa and Rosen (1978).
2with αi, βi, γij > 0. Maximization of U(x0, x1, ..., xn) subject to x0 + Σni=1 pixi = I yields linear
inverse demand functions2,3
pi = αi - βixi - Σi≠j γijxj, i = 1, ..., n. (1)
For convenience define the price, sales, intercept, and marginal cost vectors as p = (p1, ..., pn),
x = (x1, ..., xn), α = (α1, ..., αn), and c = (c1, ..., cn).
We assume that the system of inverse demand functions (1) is invertible; i.e., that the
solution of
βixi + Σi≠j γijxj = ki, i = 1, ..., n, (2)
where ki = αi - pi, exists and is unique. Let the general solution of the system be expressed as
xi = fi(k), i = 1, ..., n;4 in particular demand for good i is fi(α - p). As a solution to a system
of linear equations, function fi(k) is linear in k.
Suppose that a monopolist can produce all these goods without fixed costs, and the
marginal cost for good i is ci. The profits of the monopolist are
Π = Σni=1 xi(pi(x) - ci).
The marginal profit in xi is
∂Π/∂xi = pi - ci + xi(∂pi/∂xi) + Σi≠j xj(∂pj/∂xi)
2 Standard second order conditions apply.
3 The derivation of the demand system from utility maximization of a single consumer
ensures that the cross partials of the demand functions are equal, ∂pi/∂xj = ∂pj/∂xi = - γij.
4 Using our convention, k = (k1, ..., kn).
3= pi - ci - βixi - Σi≠j γijxj = 2pi - αi - ci. (3)
by substitution from (1) in the last two equalities.5 Therefore, at the candidate profit maximum,
defined by the first order conditions ∂Π/∂xi = 0, i = 1, ..., n, prices are
pi* = (αi + ci)/2, i = 1, ..., n. (4)
Substituting the candidate equilibrium prices in the demand system (2), we find the
candidate equilibrium sales in each good,
xi
*
= fi(α - p*) = fi((α - c)/2).
Are these sales positive for every good? To see if this is true, observe that, since function fi
is linear, scalars commute, and therefore
xi
*
= fi((α - c)/2) = fi(α - c)/2. (5)
Since, in general, given prices p, the demand for good i is fi(α - p), equation (5) says that the
candidate equilibrium sales for each good are exactly half of the demand when every good is
offered at marginal cost, i.e., when p = c. Therefore, if every good has positive sales when all
goods are sold at marginal cost, then the quantity of each good sold at the candidate equilibrium
is positive.
5 We also used the fact that in the quadratic utility function γji = ∂pj/∂xi = ∂pi/∂xj = γij.
4Theorem: If all goods have positive demands when sold at marginal cost and the
demand system is linear, then a monopolist provides positive quantities of all goods at
equilibrium.
We need to stress here that the theorem is correct for any linear demand system, even
where the willingness to pay for some good is much higher than the willingness to pay for some
other good. What happened to the "interference" in pricing from low value goods to high value
goods? Clearly, this interference is only present when the demand system is non-linear.
Although our results do not diminish the importance of "interference" in the maximization
problem of the monopolist facing non-linear demands, it shows that for the important class of
linear demand systems, a monopolist will provide all goods that would have been provided under
perfect competition. For such demand systems, monopoly does not result a distortion of variety;
it only results in the traditional allocative distortion through lower production.
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